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SETTING A NEW AGENDA FOR U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip
Alston ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. xiii + 765 pp.
Reviewed by Hurst Hannum*
The creation in January 1994 of the post of United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights' may be the most important event in
the past twenty years to affect the U.N.'s work in the area of human
rights. The High Commissioner will have "principal responsibility for
United Nations human rights activities."2 His or her broad mandate
includes providing technical assistance to governments, coordinating
U.N. public information activities, supervising the U.N.'s human rights
work, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. human
rights machinery.3 Substantively, the High Commissioner is mandated to
"promote and protect the effective enjoyment by all of all civil, cultural,
economic, political and social rights,"4 including the right to develop-
ment.5
This rather vague mandate leaves a great deal of room for personal
and political - interpretation, and one should not overestimate the
impact that any single individual is likely to have on the U.N.'s work in
the field of human rights. If the High Commissioner takes seriously the
mandate to improve efficiency and effectiveness, he or she should read
The United Nations and Human Rights6 prior to taking office. Indeed,
the new High Commissioner will need to address the fundamental
problem that underlies all of the mechanisms and procedures discussed
in the book under review: how to translate the increasing willingness of
U.N. organs to criticize and even condemn human rights violations into
an actual improvement in human rights around the world.
Evaluating the U.N.'s human rights activities should be a prerequisite
to making them more efficient and effective; Philip Alston's introductory
* Associate Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University.
1. See G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg. (1994).
2. Id. 4.
3. Id.
4. Id. I 4(a).
5. 1d 4(c).
6. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip Alston
ed., 1992) [hereinafter U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
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chapter to this book accurately notes, however, the difficulties in undertak-
ing such an evaluation.7 Examining performance or effectiveness is even
more problematic if one attempts to review the U.N. system as a whole,
including Charter-based organs, treaty bodies, and specialized agencies
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO). "[E]fforts to identify
and describe steady and principled patterns in the evolution of the various
procedures are generally misplaced,"8 and making sense out of the plethora
of U.N.-based mechanisms can be frustrating to experts as well as to
students of international human rights law.
The contributors to The United Nations and Human Rights are
uniformly knowledgeable and have themselves participated in the organs
being analyzed as independent experts, members of the U.N. secretariat,
representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or government
delegates. This gives their observations a degree of personal understanding
that cannot be gleaned from merely reading resolutions and reports.
Unfortunately, this understanding often leads to reinforcing the
common judgment of outside observers that many U.N. procedures have,
at best, very limited effectiveness. For example, neither the General
Assembly nor the Economic and Social Council has been able to deal
usefully with specific instances of even widespread human rights viola-
tions, although the Assembly has been active in adopting a number of
basic normative instruments. 9
At the same time, however, perhaps the major contribution of The
United Nations and Human Rights is the attention that it devotes to the
historical development of the bodies and procedures discussed, a factor
too often ignored by those who see only the U.N.'s contemporary
impotence in dramatically changing State behavior. Thus, while relatively
recent initiatives by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights may be
modest, the Commission's accomplishments in even addressing specific
human rights violations become more significant when they are viewed
in an appropriate historical context. This context, it should be remembered,
includes two decades of formal "abdication of responsibility"'0 for dealing
with specific human rights issues, reflecting the then-prevalent view that
U.N. attention to human rights violations in specific countries violated
7. Philip Alston, Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in id. at 1.
8. Id. at 2.
9. See Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in U.N.
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 25; Declan O'Donovan, The Economic and Social
Council, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 107, 115-21; John Quinn, The General
Assembly into the 1990s, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 55.
10. Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 6, at 126, 139.
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the Charter's prohibition against intervention in matters "which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.""
The second part of the book addresses in detail the means of
monitoring human rights treaties adopted under the auspices of the
United Nations.' 2 Each chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the
workings of the respective committees, including a balanced discussion
of the political difficulties which affect the committees' performance.
Three constants appear: (1) the relative lack of financial and staff
resources in the committees, particularly as the number of parties to the
conventions has increased; (2) the reluctance of many committee
members and governments to adopt an assertive role vis-A-vis treaty
mandates; and (3) guarded optimism that the end of the East-West con-
frontation may make it easier for the committees to develop better
monitoring techniques in the future..
The reader is also reminded of the need to avoid overestimating
even the potential role of such monitoring bodies, no matter how expert
their membership or widespread the formal support they may enjoy. The
late Torkel Opsahl, a long-time and well-respected member of the
Human Rights Committee and the European Commission on Human
Rights, emphasizes the role of the Human Rights Committee as a guar-
dian of rights through the general supervisory powers it possesses,
noting that "the Committee will never be able to control violations in all
parts of the world through complaints procedures."' 13 This observation
underscores the fundamental and irreplaceable role of national govern-
ments in the implementation and enforcement of human rights norms
4
and puts into perspective the legitimate expectations that human rights
activists should have of international oversight bodies.
In discussing the role of the U.N. Secretariat, a former Director of the
(then) Division of Human Rights mirrors many of the concerns expressed
in earlier chapters, particularly with respect to political interference with
the purportedly neutral international civil servants who serve in the U.N.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
12. See Philip Alston, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in U.N.
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 473; Andrew Byrnes, The Committee against Torture,
in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 509; Roberta Jacobson, The Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at
444; Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
6, at 369; Karl J. Partsch, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in
U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 339.
13. Opsahl, supra note 12, at 440.
14. Opsahl also recommends the strengthening of regional human rights complaints
systems. See icl.
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Center for Human Rights. 5 Balancing neutrality and advocacy on behalf
of human rights is not easy, and governments have long realized that it
is much easier to resist meaningful progress on human rights issues
through informal political pressures and budgetary constraints than it is
to attack human rights bodies directly. 16 A chapter on the International
Labour Organisation offers a striking contrast between ad hoc U.N.
procedures and an embattled Secretariat, on the one hand, and the much
better developed supervisory procedures of the ILO on the other. 7
Although the formal role given to NGOs under the ILO's tripartite
structure cannot be duplicated within the United Nations, the ILO ex-
perience does illustrate the importance of substantially improving NGO
access to the various U.N. bodies.
There have been many proposals for improving coordination among
the various intergovernmental human rights bodies,' 8 and some steps -
such as issuing a manual on reporting requirements for States under the
various treaties 9 and regular biennial meetings of the chairpersons of
supervisory committees - have recently been taken. It is true that
States which fulfill their reporting obligations conscientiously may well
begin to feel overwhelmed by the multiplicity of treaties to which they
are party; poorer States may find that comprehensive reporting is a sig-
nificant drain on scarce administrative resources. However, the mandates
and powers of the various procedures remain sufficiently different -
and human rights violations sufficiently widespread - that it is prema-
ture to call for combining procedures under the rubric of greater
efficiency.
Other proposals for improving the U.N.'s effectiveness in the field
of human rights include the adoption of formal, legal mechanisms for
human rights "trials" and creation of a "Human Rights Court" with
optional jurisdiction.2' However, such proposals are not only unlikely
15. Theo C. van Boven, The Role of the United Nations Secretariat, in U.N. AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 549.
16. For a fascinating account of the efforts of the Argentine military junta to ward off
U.N. investigations of human rights violations in Argentina in the 1970s, see lAIN GUEST,
BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
UNITED NATIONS (1990).
17. Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Or-
ganisation, in U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 580.
18. See, e.g., Klaus T. Samson, Human Rights Co-ordination within the U.N. System, in
U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 620.
19. UNITED NATIONS, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/91/1 (1991).
20. See, e.g., the recommendations in U.S. COMMISSION ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DEFINING PURPOSE: THE U.N. AND THE HEALTH OF NATIONS 23-26
(1993).
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but are also largely unnecessary. While legally binding regional
mechanisms should certainly be encouraged, the United Nations is a
political organization and its approach to human rights issues will
remain primarily political. The goal of the human rights activist should
be to support the growing expertise and independence of treaty-based
monitoring bodies and U.N. experts so that their work gradually ac-
quires greater respect; their conclusions and observations can then serve
both to encourage government compliance and to goad the more overtly
political U.N. organs into action.
Recognizing the political nature of the United Nations does not
mean conceding that the United Nations should let geostrategic or
regional bloc interests dictate which human rights situations will be
seriously considered and which ignored. One essential requirement for
more effective U.N. action is less selectivity in the expression of human
rights concerns, although a desire to achieve geopolitical balance must
not prevent attention being paid to egregious human rights violations
wherever they occur.
Among the specific areas in which the effectiveness of the United
Nations can be improved are (1) fact-finding, (2) response capabilities,
and (3) publicity:
(1) Creation of the position of High Commissioner for Human
Rights should be viewed as an opportunity to expand significantly the
capacity of the U.N. Center for Human Rights to perform its assigned
human rights functions. Although more money will not in itself lead to
more effective protection of human rights, it is an essential prerequisite.
Members of the Secretariat who service the treaty-based bodies must be
better able to prepare the committees to consider States' periodic
reports, as well as to investigate individual complaints. In addition, they
must be primarily responsible to the committees, not to the ultimately
political dictates of the U.N. Secretary-General.
The United Nations can become much more efficient in terms of
collecting and utilizing information already available to it. Separate
country files should be created in which all information related to
human rights in every U.N. Member State can be collected and made
available to oversight committees, special rapporteurs, members of the
Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and others. The
Secretariat should be encouraged to provide relevant information to all
U.N. organs which deal with human rights, so that resolutions and
investigations can be based, insofar as possible, on facts rather than on
political rhetoric.
Spring 1994]
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(2) The High Commissioner for Human Rights and appropriate
officials within the Center for Human Rights must have the authority to
respond immediately and as they deem most appropriate to well-founded
reports of serious human rights violations. The High Commissioner's
mandate "to promote and protect" human rights2 should be interpreted
to grant at least as much authority as that of the so-called "thematic"
rapporteurs and working groups of the Commission on Human Rights,
who are directed to "respond effectively '22 to information they receive.
The High Commissioner's authority should include not only direct
contacts with governments but also the ability to request meetings of
relevant U.N. bodies, such as the Commission and Sub-Commission and
their subsidiary bodies, as well as the office of the Secretary-General
and the Security Council in the case of massive violations.
Treaty bodies should have the authority and the financial capacity to
convene special sessions to consider urgent situations of gross violations
of human rights. Where necessary, this authority should be confirmed by
appropriate amendments to existing treaties.
(3) Information provided by governments and NGOs to the United
Nations must be made much more accessible to the public. Periodic
reports by governments, comments and findings by treaty bodies, and
reports by special rapporteurs should not be hidden under obscure U.N.
document numbers; they should be produced in sufficient quantity so
that national human rights groups and others have easy access to them.
A separate section of the U.N. Center should devote itself to ensuring
that individuals in every country have effective access to information
about human rights norms and procedures.
In addition, NGOs remain the key to the effective functioning of all
U.N. bodies concerned with human rights, and their access to these
bodies must be ensured. Only if information provided by NGOs is
readily available will oversight bodies be able to do their jobs and
governments be held accountable.
Increased fact-finding and response capabilities will only be mean-
ingful if the United Nations - which means its Member States - is
willing to use its political and moral power to affect State behavior.
While the limits of the Security Council's effectiveness have been
shown only too clearly in Somalia and Haiti, the Council appears to be
willing to act in some instances of massive human rights violations.
However, the Council is not the only source of U.N. pressure. General
21. G.A. Res. 48/141, supra note 1, 1 4(a) (emphasis added).
22. E.S.C. Res. 1985/33, U.N. ESCOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 71-72, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/66 (1985).
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Assembly resolutions and special rapporteurs have had at least some
impact on situations as diverse as those in South Africa, Chile, Central
America, and Poland, if only in supporting democratic alternatives to
repressive regimes. The Commission on Human Rights has become a
major diplomatic battleground in which governments feel forced to
defend themselves publicly.
Only if the United Nations is willing to address human rights viola-
tions in a consistent and persistent manner will governments be
encouraged to change and democratic opposition movements be given
support to continue their struggles. The appraisals in The United Nations
and Human Rights provide an invaluable benchmark against which
future U.N. actions may be judged. Its cautious optimism must now be
matched by a sustained, realistic commitment by governments to ensur-
ing that the rights proclaimed nearly fifty years ago by the General
Assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are realized in
practice.
